

11 OCT 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [ ] Reports on S&TI

[ ]

2. Bill opened the meeting by pointing out that he thought the [ ] paper on CIA S&TI was an excellent report. He also had a number of follow-up points which he wanted to discuss. Bill indicated that he thought the report would have been more useful as a basis for further analysis if the results of the consumer survey portion had been recorded in quantitative form. By not doing so, the specifics of who had been contacted in preparing the report, what they had to say about which notional S&TI tasks, their reactions to CIA S&TI publications, and how they might be useful to their activities, had been lost.

3. In the course of the conversation, Bill pointed out that the Community budget indicates that CIA spends [ ] production activities, while DIA [ ] By restricting its attention to CIA products, the report's contribution toward the broader issue of achieving better utilization of S&TI overall was bound to be limited, even if the suspicion that the CIA's dollars were more highly leveraged proved correct. He also noted that it is also much more costly to collect S&TI than to produce it. Bill also explained that S&TI is much more expensive than political, military or economic intelligence to both produce and collect, and that [ ] of the national production budget is reported as devoted to S&TI activities.

4. Bill posed the following questions: Are there really any national S&TI requirements in a final product sense? If not, should CIA be involved in the production of S&TI? If so, is it realistic to expect DIA to efficiently distribute CIA (i.e., the "competition's") products to its departmental R&D and materiel acquisition consumers, where the principal interest in S&TI appears to lie? Given the demand for more and better national intelligence products, are measures which tilt a part of CIA's production orientation toward DoD's departmental interests desirable? Can the contribution of S&TI to decisions about force structure, weapons design or military tactics be documented via specific cases?

5. The discussion reached these conclusions:

25X1 a. [ ] will go ahead and publish its final report on CIA S&TI.

25X1 b. [ ] will prepare a draft covering memo for the report and deliver 3 copies of the report to the undersigned.

c. Undersigned will discuss report with A/D/PAO to determine what type of distribution should be made of the report. [ ] can provide additional copies of the report if needed. 25X1

25X1 d. [ ] agreed to monitor the 2 remaining reports on "S&TI Support to Developers of Military Tactics and Doctrine" and the "S&TI Evaluation Process" on a part-time basis.

25X1 e. [ ] agreed to review the completed reports and provide his recommendations on what should be done on the reports to the A/D/PAO.

6. In conclusion, it was agreed that a continuing issue of the Resource Management Staff is how much future analytic effort can be profitably invested in trying to understand the S&TI production question. On the one hand, there appears to be a widely held conviction that production and dissemination activities in general, and the S&TI subject area in particular, may offer the greatest potential for improving the Community's overall performance. But this is also the sphere least amenable to quantitative analysis, which makes further analytic investment a high-risk venture. Moreover, production is not the area in which the Community's major resource allocation decisions reside.

25X1 cc: [ ]

25X1 [ ]